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		BY DISTRICT COURT BY DEPUTY
	IN THE UNITED S	TATES DISTRICT COURT
	FOR THE DI	STRICT OF ARIZONA
Terri A	A. Alward, et al.,)
	Plaintiffs,) CV-00-365-PHX-ROS
	v.) Order
	le's Information Services, a New	}
Jersey limited liability company, dba Arizona Clipping Service, et al.,)
	Defendants.	
		_)
	Pending before the Court are the	following motions:
(1) Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs (Doc. #37);		
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Time to File Further Pleadings (Doc. #40-1);		
(3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Prior Orders (Doc. #40-2);		
(4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order (Doc. #40-3);		
(5) Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay All Orders Against Plaintiffs Including Sanctions (Doc. #40-4); ¹		
(6) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Dismiss all of Defendants' Motions and Responses to Plaintiffs' Motion for Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants (Doc. #44-1);		
(7)	Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (Doc. #44-2);	and Reinstate Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #44-3):2 1 (8) 2 (9) Defendants' Motion to Seal Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motions (Doc. #46-1): 3 Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #46-2); (10)4 (11)Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Judgment (Doc. #47); 5 (12)Defendants' Motion to Seal Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #51-1); Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #51-2); 6 (13)7 (14)Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #53); 8 Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Defendants' Motion for Attorneys (15)Fees and Costs (Doc. #54); 9 (16)Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Entry of Order for Attorneys' Fees and Costs 10 (Doc. #55-1); Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions for Unethical Conduct (Doc. #55-2); 11 (17)Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Orders and Submit Future Affidavits in Camera 12 (18)(Doc. #56). 13 Background 14 Plaintiffs Terri Alward and Patricia Rader filed their original Complaint on 15 February 25, 2000 (Doc. #1). Alward, Rader, and fifteen other Plaintiffs filed a First 16 Amended Complaint on April 25, 2000 (Doc. #2).³ The Amended Complaint alleges 17 18 violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981.a(a)(2) and 19 2005e(5)(g), and other statutory violations.

On February 27, 2001, the Court entered judgment dismissing this case. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #35) of the Court's February 27, 2001 Order (Doc. #32), and Defendant filed a Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs (Doc. #37). On March 14, 2001, the Court issued an Order denying Plaintiffs'

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² Motions listed as 6 through 8 make up "Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion[s] (Part 2)" ("Second "Omnibus" Motion").

³ On December 29, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (Sealed Doc. #20). In its February 27, 2001 Order, the Court ordered Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint sealed and stricken from the record.

Motion for Reconsideration and granting Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs (Doc. #36).

After the Court's March 14, 2001 Order, Plaintiffs filed two "Omnibus" Motions which include seven distinct motions. Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" Motion, filed on March 22, 2001, includes: (1) one motion for reconsideration; (2) one motion for stay of judgment; (3) one motion for extension of time to file further pleadings; and (4) one motion for relief from order. Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion, filed on March 31, 2001, includes: (1) one motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint; (2) one motion to strike and dismiss Defendants' motions and responses; and (3) one motion for reconsideration. Moreover, Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion purports to incorporate all motions from their First "Omnibus" Motion. In addition to their "Omnibus" Motions, Plaintiffs have filed: (1) one motion to stay judgment; (2) two motions for sanctions; (3) one motion for summary entry of order for attorneys fees; and (4) one motion to amend prior Orders of the Court. Finally, on April 18, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Doc. #48).

In response to Plaintiffs' filings, Defendants have filed six motions: (1) one motion for attorneys' fees and costs; (2) two motions to seal; (3) two motions for sanctions; and (4) one motion for summary disposition of attorneys' fees.

This Order addresses only sixteen of the above listed motions on the merits because Plaintiffs' appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has divested this Court of jurisdiction over two of the motions, as discussed below.

Discussion

I. JURISDICTION

A. Effect of a Notice of Appeal on District Court Jurisdiction

The filing of a notice of appeal generally divests the district court of jurisdiction over the matters appealed. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Southwest Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the matters being appealed.") (Quoting <u>Griggs v. Provident Consumer</u>

Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)); see also Hunter Douglas Corp. v. Lando Prods., 235 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1956); Davis v. United States, 667 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1982).

The District Court, however, retains jurisdiction to assist the Court of Appeals in asserting its jurisdiction. <u>Id.</u> Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that District Courts retain jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees during the pendency of an appeal. <u>Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co.</u>, 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983).

B. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)

As shown above, the principle of exclusive appellate jurisdiction is not absolute. Natural Resources Defense Council, 242 F.3d at 1166. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) dictates that certain timely filed post-judgment motions stay a Notice of Appeal until the disposition of the outstanding motion. Rule 4(a)(4)(B) provides:

[i]f a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment—but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)—the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered.

Rule 4(a)(4)(A) enumerates the motions over which the District Court retains jurisdiction in. The enumerated motions consist of *timely* motions made pursuant to the following Rules: (1) Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b); (3) Fed. R. Civ. P. 54; (4) Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; and (5) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Thus, a timely motion pursuant to any of these Rules stays a Notice of Appeal, allowing the District Court to resolve the pending Motion.

II. PLAINTIFFS' FIRST "OMNIBUS" MOTION⁴

The Court entered judgment in this case against Plaintiffs on February 27, 2001. Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" Motion was filed on March 22, 2001. Plaintiffs then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2001. As discussed above, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) stays a of Notice of Appeal when any of several enumerated motions is timely filed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). Because Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" Motion does not

⁴ Plaintiffs' motion is titled "Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion[s]," and is comprised of four distinct motions. This Order addresses each motion in turn.

contain any timely motion enumerated in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" Motion does not operate to stay Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" Motion.

A. Plaintiffs' Motion[s] per FRCVP 6(b) and Local R. 1.10(n) for Enlargement of Time

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 1.10(n) ("Local Rules"), Plaintiffs filed "Motion[s] per FRCVP 6(b) and Local R. 1.10(n) for Enlargement of Time" (Doc. #40-1) ("Motion for Enlargement of Time"). As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time does not comply with Local Rule 1.10(n). Local Rule 1.10(n) requires that "[i]mmediately below the title of such motion . . . there shall also be included a statement indicating whether it is the first, second, or third, etc. requested extension." Plaintiffs' motion includes no such statement.

Moreover, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Enlargement of Time on March 22, 2001. Plaintiffs then filed a Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2001. While a notice of appeal generally divests the District Court of jurisdiction, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) enumerates several post-judgment motions over which the District Court retains jurisdiction, but motions for enlargement of time pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(n) are not included. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for an Enlargement of Time.

⁵ Even if the Court had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion for an Enlargement of Time, Plaintiffs fail to specify what pleadings they wish to file or how much time they are requesting to file such pleadings. Also, both Rule 6(b) and Local Rule 1.10(n) require requests for enlargement of time to be filed before the time prescribed for doing the act if the request is made to reconsider pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 59, or 60. Hence, it is impossible to discern whether Plaintiff timely filed his Motion for Enlargement of Time. Moreover, Plaintiffs' request for time to file pleadings in connection with issues on which the Court has already decide in prior Orders, or issues decided in this Order, is moot.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration per Loc.R.1.10(p)

As part of their First "Omnibus" Motion, filed on March 22, 2001, Plaintiffs make a "Motion for Reconsideration per Loc.R.1.10(p)" ("Motion for Reconsideration") (Doc. #40-2). A motion for reconsideration is construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) if it is filed within 10 days of entry of judgment. American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. North Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Nutricology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992)). When filed more than 10 days after entry of judgment, a motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from judgment or order. Id. at 899.

In the case at bar, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2001—23 days after the Court entered judgment on February 27, 2001. Therefore, the Court will construe Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) provides that a District Court retains jurisdiction to consider a motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, but only if the Rule 60 motion is "filed no later than 10 days (computed using Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)) after the judgment is entered." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Therefore, because Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was filed more than 10 days after entry of judgment, Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, filed on April 13, 2001, divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

C. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order per FRCVP 60(b)(3) and (6)

As part of their First "Omnibus" Motion, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Relief from Order per FRCVP 60(b)(3) and (6)" ("Motion for Relief from Order") (Doc. #40-3). As discussed above, the District Court may consider a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 motion if it is filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief From Order was filed on March 22, 2001—17 days after entry of judgment, computed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Therefore, because Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief

from Order was filed more than 10 days after the Court entered judgment in this case on February 27, 2001, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

D. Plaintiffs' Motion for Stay of Order per FRCVP 62(b) for Good Cause and Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants

Purportedly pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b), as part of their First "Omnibus" Motion, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Stay from Order per FRCVP 62(b) for Good Cause and Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants" ("Motion for Stay of Order") (Doc. #40-4). Rule 62(b) allows for a stay of judgment pending the disposition of post-judgment motions made pursuant to Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 50, 52(b), 59, or 60. Because Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2001, and no post-judgment motions within the purview of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) were timely filed, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Stay of Order. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Stay of Order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III. Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion⁶

The Court entered judgment in this case against Plaintiffs on February 27, 2001. Plaintiffs filed their Second "Omnibus" Motion on March 31, 2001. Plaintiffs then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2001 (Doc. #48). As discussed above, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) stays a of notice of appeal when any of several enumerated motions is timely filed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). Because Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion does not contain any timely motion enumerated in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion does not stay Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

On March 31, 2001 Plaintiffs filed a Second "Omnibus" Motion that incorporates prayers for relief requested in their First "Omnibus" Motion. To the extent these prayers for relief are addressed in this Order regarding Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" Motion, they are not readdressed here, and the previous rulings apply to Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion.

A. Plaintiffs' Motion[s] in Opposition to/Request to Deny/Strike/Dismiss ALL of Defendants' Motions/Responses to Plaintiffs' Motions for Good Cause and Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants

On March 31, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion[s] in Opposition to/Request to Deny/Strike/Dismiss ALL of Defendants' Motions/Responses to Plaintiffs' Motions, for *Good Cause and Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants*" ("Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss") (Doc. #44-1) as part of their Second Omnibus Motion (Doc. #44). In their Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss, Plaintiffs argue that "Defendants' failings [sic] herein are/were of a **DELIBERATE**, **MISLEADING**, **DECEITFUL** nature." (Pls.' Mot. to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss at 5).

Plaintiffs do not set forth an applicable rule upon which their Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss is based. If Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss is not based on a Rule enumerated in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), then Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, filed April 13, 2001, divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss. Moreover, to the extent the Motion is based upon one of the Rules enumerated in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss is untimely.

The longest period for any enumerated motion in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) is 14 days, which applies to a Motion for Attorneys Fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss was filed 22 days after entry of judgment. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny, Strike, and Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Reinstate Plaintiffs' 1st Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs also filed a "Motion to Reconsider and Reinstate Plaintiffs' 1st Amended Complaint" ("Motion to Reconsider and Reinstate") (Doc. #44-2) as part of their Second "Omnibus" Motion. As discussed above, a motion for reconsideration filed more than 10 days after entry of judgment is construed as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc., 248 F.3d at 899. While Fed. R.

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App. P. operates to allow the District Court to consider a Rule 60 motion, it also states that the motion must be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Reinstate was filed on March 31, 2001—22 days after the Court entered judgment on February 27, 2001. Therefore, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Reinstate, and it will be denied.

C. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

On March 31, 2001, more than one full month after judgment was entered, Plaintiffs, as part of their Second "Omnibus" Motion, filed a Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #44-3). Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint is not based upon one of the rules enumerated in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint does not retain jurisdiction in the District Court. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IV. PLAINTIFFS' TIME URGENT MOTION FOR STAY PER FRCVP 62(B) PENDING COURT REVIEW OF POST-ORDER PLEADINGS

On April 13, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a "TIME URGENT Motion for Stay Per FRCVP 62(b) Pending court Review of Post-Order Pleadings" ("Second Motion for Stay") (Doc. #47), requesting a stay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b). Rule 62(b) allows the Court to stay execution of judgment pending the outcome of certain post-judgment motions.

Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay requests the Court to stay proceedings "because the standard statute of limitations for filing an appeal with the 9th Circuit in re the Court's current/last Order in this matter expires later <u>THIS DATE</u> [April 13, 2001]." Subsequent to their Second Motion for Stay, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2001. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay is not based upon any of the rules enumerated

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To the extent Plaintiffs' Motion may be construed as a motion made pursuant to one of the enumerated rules, Plaintiffs' Motion is untimely because Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay was filed more than 14 days after the Court entered judgment in this case on February 27, 2001. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).

in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). To the extent that Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay may be construed as a motion pursuant to one of the enumerated rules, Plaintiffs' Motion is untimely because Plaintiffs' filed their Second Motion for Stay more than 14 days after the Court entered judgment in this case on February 27, 2001. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' Second Motion for stay. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

V. PLAINTIFFS' LIMITED RESPONSE/OPPOSITION TO DEFENSE'S DILATORY [UNTIMELY] AND MISLEADING PLEADING AND MOTION[S] OF APRIL 16, 2001 --AND-- MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENSE COUNSEL[S]

On April 18, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a "Limited Response/Opposition to Defense's Dilatory [Untimely] and Misleading Pleading and Motion[s] of April 16, 2001 --and-Motion for Sanctions Against Defense Counsel[s]" ("Motion for Sanctions") (Doc. #53). As discussed above, the general rule is that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the District Court of jurisdiction with respect to all matters appealed. Natural Res. Def. Council, 242 F.3d at 1166. The Ninth Circuit, however, has ruled that the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal. Masalosalo by Masalosalo, 718 F.2d at 957. Thus, because the Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions does not deal with the matters being appealed, and because the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal, the Court has jurisdiction to decide the motion, though Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2001 (Doc. #48).

A. Plaintiffs' Untimeliness Argument

In their Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion is untimely pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e). (Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions at 2). Plaintiffs are mistaken.

⁸ Moreover, even if the Court had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' motion, the impending deadline that prompted Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay is no longer a factor, and Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Stay is moot.

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Local Rule 1.10(c) sets the time for filing a responsive memorandum at 10 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) requires that "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) indicates that when service is made by mail, "3 days shall be added to the prescribed period."

Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion was filed and served on Defendants by first class mail on March 31, 2001, making the last day for a timely filing of Defendants' Response April 18, 2001. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion was filed on April 16, 2001. Thus, pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(c) and Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(e), Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion was timely filed.

B. Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions

Plaintiffs, without citing or discussing authorities for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, proceed to request an award of attorneys' fees and costs against defense counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 provides:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

"Section 1927 authorizes the imposition of sanctions against any lawyer who wrongfully proliferates litigation proceedings once a case has commenced." Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines. Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1999). Sanctions may be imposed under § 1927 only if there has been a determination of bad faith. Id. at 1118. Court "assess an attorney's bad faith under a subjective standard. Knowing or reckless conduct meets this standard." Id. (quoting MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Plaintiffs' contend that Defendants' Motion to Seal and Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #51) entitles Plaintiffs to Sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because of continued and repeated deceit of the Court, arguing that:

The deceitful and misleading problem with this teeth-grinding of Defense

Counsel[s] is that Plaintiff[s] properly sought leave to file this 2nd amended complaint with a motion for the same at pp. 17-19 of its omnibus motion of the 31st of March 2001.... Defense Counsel[s]...er, "forgot" to mention that the attached proposed 2nd amended complaint was included with the motion in re the same, as part of its pleadings of that date.... The false and misleading and deceitful characterization of the "brazenly attached" document [as Defense Counsel[s] describe the same] is only outweighed in the arena of brazen actions by the author[s]' half-truth whining complaint in re the same.

(Pl. Mot. for Sanctions at 4). Plaintiffs' conclusory allegations against Defense Counsel do not establish that Defense Counsel knowingly or recklessly filed their Motion to Seal and Motion for Sanctions in bad faith. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions.

VI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ENTRY OF ORDER FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AGAINST DEFENSE COUNSEL[S] UNDER 28 U.S.C. # 1927 [SIC] AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENSE COUNSEL[S] FOR UNETHICAL MISCONDUCT

On April 25, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Summary Entry of Order for Attorneys Fees and Costs Against Defense Counsel[s] Under 28 U.S.C. # 1927 [sic] and Motion For Sanctions Against Defense Counsel[s] for Unethical Misconduct" ("Motion for Summary Entry of Attorneys Fees" and "Motion for Sanctions," respectively) (Doc. #55). As discussed above, because the instant Motion does not deal with the matters being appealed, and because the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal, the Court has jurisdiction to decide the instant Motion even though Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2001 (Doc. #48). See Natural Res. Def. Council, 242 F.3d at 1166; Masalosalo by Masalosalo, 718 F.2d at 957.

A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Entry of Order for Attorneys Fees and Costs Against Defense Counsel[s] Under 28 U.S.C. # 1927 [sic]

In their Motion for Summary Entry of Attorneys Fees, Plaintiffs request summary entry of attorneys' fees against defense counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1927. Because the Court has denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions filed on April 18, 2001 (Doc. #53), the Court will deny as moot Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Entry of Attorneys' Fees.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Against Defense Counsel[s] for Unethical Misconduct

Without making any argument or setting forth any basis for the imposition of Rule

11 sanctions, Plaintiffs, in their prayer for relief, also request sanctions against defense counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 requires that a motion for sanctions "describe the specific conduct alleged to violate" the rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 requires that "a motion for sanctions . . . be made separately from other motions and requests" and that the motion "shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion" the alleged violation is not corrected. Id.

Because Plaintiffs' Motion fails to comply with each of the above listed requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions, to the extent Plaintiffs request Rule 11 sanctions against defense counsel.

VII. PLAINTIFFS' SUBMISSOIN [SIC] OF <u>NEW EVIDENCE</u> TO COURT AMENDING PRIOR PLEADINGS, PER FRCVP 60(B)(1) [MEDICAL "EXCUSE" JUSTIFIED]; AND MOTION TO COURT TO <u>AMEND</u> ORDER[S] AND SUBMIT FUTURE AFFIDAVITS *IN CAMERA*

As mentioned above, on April 13, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit (Doc. #48). On April 25, 2001 Plaintiffs filed a Submissoin [sic] of NEW EVIDENCE to Court amending prior pleadings, per FRCVP 60(b)(1) [medical "excuse" justified]; AND MOTION to Court to AMEND Order[s] and submit future affidavits in camera ("Motion to Amend") (Doc. #56). Because Plaintiffs' filed a Notice of Appeal, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant this motion. Davis, 667 F.2d 822 at 824; Hunter Douglas Corp., 235 F.2d 631 at 632.9 Also, after a final judgment has been entered in an action, a motion to amend "may be considered only if the judgment is first reopened under Rule 59 or 60." Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1335, 1356 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend.

VIII. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MARCH 22, 2001 OMNIBUS MOTION[S] --AND-- MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFFS' OMNIBUS MOTION[S], AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

In response to Plaintiffs First "Omnibus" Motion (Doc. # 40), on April 9, 2001,

⁹ For discussion of the effects of filing Notice of Appeal on the jurisdiction of this court, see section I.

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Defendants filed a pleading titled "Response to Plaintiffs' March 22, 2001 Omnibus Motion[s] --and— Motion to Seal Omnibus Motion[s], and Motion for Sanctions" ("Defendants' First Motion to Strike and Seal" and "Defendants' First Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927," respectively) (Doc. # 46-1 & 46-2).

As mentioned above, the general rule is that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the District Court of jurisdiction with respect to all matters being appealed. Natural Res. Def. Council, 242 F.3d at 1166. The Ninth Circuit, however, has ruled that the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal. Masalosalo by Masalosalo, 718 F.2d at 957. Therefore, because Defendants' First Motion to Strike and Seal, and Defendants' First Motion for Sanctions are not within the scope of the matters on appeal, and because the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendants' Motions.

Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal Plaintiffs' First "Omnibus" A. Motion

Pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(e), a response to Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal was due on April 26, 2001. Plaintiffs filed no Response. Pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(e), Plaintiffs had 13 days from the date of service to file a response to Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal. The consequence of failing to respond to this Motion is set forth in Local Rule 1.10(i), which provides: "[I]f the opposing party does not serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily." Thus, pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(i), the Court may deem Plaintiffs' failure to respond to Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal a consent to the granting of the Motion. See Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652 (9th Cir. 1994).

Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' First Omnibus Motion contains scandalous and defamatory material that justifies striking and sealing it. The scandalous and defamatory

material in question has previously been stricken and sealed as part of the Court's February 27, 2001 Order striking and sealing Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); Erection Co., Inc., 900 F.2d at 170. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants' First Motion to Strike and Seal.

B. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1927 10

Defendants also request an award of attorneys' fees and costs in connection with their Motion to Strike and to Seal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. As discussed above, "Section 1927 authorizes the imposition of sanctions against any lawyer who wrongfully proliferates litigation proceedings once a case has commenced." Pacific Harbor Capital, 210 F.3d at 1117. Sanctions may be imposed under § 1927 only if there has been a determination of bad faith. Id. at 1118. The Court "assess[es] an attorney's bad faith under a subjective standard. Knowing or reckless conduct meets this standard." Id. (quoting MGIC Indem. Corp., 952 F.2d at 1121-22).

Defendants claim that by including scandalous and defamatory material in their First "Omnibus" Motion, Plaintiffs have unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in this case. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have acted in bad faith by filing their First Omnibus Motion which repeats the same scandalous and defamatory material that the Court previously sealed and struck as part of Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Complaint filed on December 29, 2000 (Doc. #20). Indeed, this is the third time that the Court has been required to strike scandalous and defamatory material from one of Plaintiffs' pleadings. See 12/15/00 Order (Doc. #18) and 2/27/01 Order (Doc. #32). The Court will therefore allow Defendants to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with their Motion to Strike and to Seal. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' First Motion for Sanctions

¹⁰ In its Order dated February 27, 2001, the Court granted a motion filed by Defendants for attorneys fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

IX. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MARCH 31, 2001 OMNIBUS MOTION[S] (PART 2) --AND-- MOTION TO SEAL AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

On March 31, 2001, Plaintiffs filed their Second "Omnibus" Motion (Doc. #44) to which Defendants filed a response titled "Response to Plaintiffs' March 31, 2001 Omnibus Motion[s] (Part 2) --and-- Motion to Seal and Motion for Sanctions" ("Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint" and "Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927," respectively) (Doc. #51-1 & 51-2).

As discussed above, the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal. <u>Masalosalo by Masalosalo</u>, 718 F.2d at 957. Because, Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended complaint and Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions are not a part of the matters on appeal, and because the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the Defendants' motions.

A. Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion contains scandalous and defamatory material in that Plaintiffs attached a copy of their proposed Second Amended Complaint. (Pl. Mot. at 2). Defendants request that the Court, once again, strike and seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. (Pl. Mot. at 3).

As mentioned above, the Court had already stricken and sealed Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Complaint because it contains scandalous and defamatory material.

In their First Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Defendants also seek to amend the amount of their requested attorneys' fees to include their fees incurred in connection with the motion ("Motion to Amend their Motion for Attorneys' Fees") (Doc. #46-2). Because the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Attorneys Fees (Doc. #54), however, the Court will deny as moot Defendants Motion to Amend their prior Motion for Attorneys' Fees. This does not, however, preclude Defendants from filing in the future a motion for attorneys' fees in connection with the granting of Defendants' First Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have again filed the same proposed Second Amended Complaint containing the same scandalous and defamatory material, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Strike and Seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiffs' Second "Omnibus" Motion.

B. Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Defendants also request an award of attorneys' fees and costs in connection with their Motion to Strike and to Seal (Doc. # 51). As discussed above, sanctions may be imposed under § 1927 only if there has been a determination of bad faith. Pacific Harbor Capital, 210 F.3d at 1118. The Court "assess[es] an attorney's bad faith under a subjective standard. Knowing or reckless conduct meets this standard." Id. (quoting MGIC Indem. Corp., 952 F.2d at1121-22).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' attachment of the Second Amended Complaint, which previously had been stricken and sealed by the Court, demonstrates bad faith on the part of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

X. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1927

On March 13, 2001, Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ("Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs") (Doc. #37). In their Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Defendants set forth the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to which they claim to be entitled under the Court's February 27, 2001 Order which awarded Defendants' attorneys' fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (Def. Mot. for Attorneys Fees at 2). On April 20, 2001, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Doc. #54) ("Motion for Summary Disposition of Attorneys Fees and Costs").

Because the Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Attorneys Fees and Costs does not deal with the matters being appealed, and because the District Court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendancy of an appeal, the Court has

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jurisdiction to consider Defendants' Motion.

Pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(e), a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees was due on March 30, 2001. No Response was filed. As discussed above, the consequence of failing to respond to Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs is set forth in Local Rule 1.10(i), which provides: "[I]f the opposing party does not serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily." Thus, pursuant to Local Rule 1.10(i), the Court may deem Plaintiffs' failure to respond to Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees a consent to the granting of the Motion. Moreover, the Court has reviewed the costs and attorneys' fees and finds them to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion[s] per FRCVP 6(b) and Local R. 1.10(n) for Enlargement of Time (Doc. # 40-1) is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration per Loc.R.1.10(p) (Doc. #40-2) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order per FRCVP 60(b)(3) and (6) (Doc. #40-3) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Stay of Order per FRCVP 62(b) for *Good Cause and Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants* (Doc. #40-4) is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Request to Deny/Strike/Dismiss All of Defendants' Motions and Responses to Plaintiffs' Motions for <u>Good Cause and Demonstrable Pattern of Bad Faith by Defendants</u> (Doc. #44-1) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Reinstate Plaintiffs' 1st Amended complaint (Doc. #44-2) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #44-3) is DENIED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' TIME URGENT Motion for Stay Per FRCVP 62(b) Pending Court Review of Post-Order Pleadings (Doc. #47-1) is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Limited Response/Opposition to Defense's Dilatory [Untimely] and Misleading Pleading and Motion[s] of April 16, 2001 --and-- Motion for Sanctions Against Defense Counsel[s] (Doc. #53) is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Entry of Order for Attorneys Fees and Costs Against Defense Counsel[s] Under 28 U.S.C. # 1927 [sic] and Motion For Sanctions Against Defense Counsel[s] for Unethical Misconduct (Doc. #55) is **DENIED** as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Submissoin [sic] of NEW **EVIDENCE** to Court amending prior pleadings, per FRCVP 60(b)(1) [medical "excuse" justified]; AND MOTION to Court to AMEND Order[s] and submit future affidavits in camera (Doc. #56) is **DENIED** for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Seal Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion[s] (Doc. #46-1) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike and seal Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion[s] (Doc. #40).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Doc. #46-2) is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #51) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to Seal Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion[s] (Part 2) (Doc. #44).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Doc. #51) is GRANTED.

DATED this <u>5</u> day of December, 2001.

United States District Judge